2017: Between “Mythos,” Encyclical, and the Right to an Analog Life

1. Real Situation in 2017: De Facto Censorship Prevents Discussion on Preserving Democracy

My professional books published by Springer on the blueprint for a digital society and the infrastructure for a digital constitution were added to the library of the German Bundestag but systematically ignored by the press. Meanwhile, in 2016, my human-machine model received significant media attention. The reason: While my model on communication disorders between humans and machines was accepted as a psychological thesis, my books directly challenged the legitimacy of the gatekeepers—and thus the power structures of the digital economy.

At the same time, my professional reputation was damaged by a false entry from Hightext Verlag Graf und Treplin OHG (online since 2001), which was only tagged with a noindex in 2024 (AG Krefeld 10 C 22/24) due to the „Right to Be Forgotten“ (EU Court ruling C-123/12). Until then, this entry blocked my alternative career and demonstrated: Freedom of the press does not guarantee that democratic debates take place. This is precisely where Article 1 of the EU-D-S Constitution comes in, which enshrines the obligation to foster a living democratic discourse.

2. Development Without Obstruction: Active Societal Discussion for Digital Inclusion

Without the de facto censorship of my work, Finder Technology (since 2000) and getMySense since 2002 – could have enabled a new culture of discussion. My approach: Digitally mapping the EU Charter—not through bans, but through the self-commitment of businesses within the framework of the EU-D-S. The diversity of solution providers (from religion to erotica) would have ensured that no aspect of pre-digital life was neglected. Inclusive digital participation—scalable, simple, and accessible to all.

3. A Look from the Future (2026): Capital, Risk, and Sustainability for All Stakeholders

Today, I see how the petition for a Right to an Analog Life points to the exclusion of around one million citizens in Germany alone from the digital society but offers no solution. Such a right would further weaken the economy and create new bureaucracy—instead of reducing it. It would result in a two-class society with additional red tape. The real solution lies in the 1985 breakthrough, when adult illiterates learned to read and write using an individualized method: Digital participation must be as simple as this method—not as complex as the current interaction between humans and AI, and the resulting complicated regulation of gatekeepers without effective impact.

The debate about Anthropic’s myth and AI control shows: We are losing control over AI systems because speed, data volume, and impacts are no longer manageable. The USA dominates AI development through massive capital—and thus creates a „killswitch scenario„: Either you submit to our protection, or we switch you off. Here, retroactive digital laws or funding are of no use. Only a holistic European digital concept—like Trusted WEB 4.0—can secure digital sovereignty.

Pope Leo XIV emphasizes this in his encyclical „Magnifica Humanitas“ (2026): „Disarmament means breaking the equation between technical power and the right to rule.“

This is exactly what the EU-D-S achieves: Diversity through citizens behind the smallest meaningful units and businesses behind defined categories. No area of life is excluded—and thus all people are included.

4. GAP 2017: Digital Uncertainty Without an Adapted Societal Concept

Carryover from Previous Years:

  • 2000: Mannesmann Takeover – €133 billion (Loss of European Sovereignty)
  • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach Blockade€18 billion
  • 2004–2006: Revenue Losses due to US Platforms€54.3 billion
  • 2003–2016: Loss of Trust in Economy & Digitalization€10,242 billion
  • 2008: Financial Crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
  • 2009: Cyber Damages€24 billion
  • 2011: Cyber Damages€9 billion
  • 2010: Incorrect Digital Strategy€70.5 billion
  • 2010: GDP Decline in the EU€200 billion
  • 2011: Cyber Damages€9 billion
  • 2012: Cyberattacks€24 billion

GAP 2017:

  • Loss of Trust (14% of 2017 GDP: €15.1 trillion) – €2,114 billion

Total GAP 2017: €13,398.8 Billion

If the EU had avoided the GAP, it would not have had any debt in 2026 and could still have invested significantly in digital infrastructure:

The total debt of the EU (EU-27) for 2026 is not directly stated as an absolute figure in current sources. However, the EU’s debt-to-GDP ratio is 82.1% (as of Q3 2025, published January 2026). With an estimated EU-27 GDP of around €16.4 trillion (2022) and a slight increase in subsequent years, this would imply a debt level of approximately €13.5 trillion for the EU-27 in 2026.

In 2017, the gatekeepers (Google, Amazon) dominated with revenues of €97.55 billion (Google) and €156.55 billion (Amazon)—sums that could have flowed into European alternatives but instead cemented Europe’s dependence. While the European Commission imposed a record fine of €2.4 billion on Google for abuse of market dominance, this did not solve the structural problem: Europe reacts instead of shaping.

Possible Developments (1999–2007):

  • 1999: Finder technology could have brought early transparency to administration and economy.
  • 2002: getmysense could have given citizens control over digital data.
  • 2003: GISAD could have combined data protection and location services.
  • 2004: EU-D-S could have given Europe digital sovereignty.
  • 2007: WAN anonymity could have made mass surveillance impossible.

Sources

1. Arguments and Links by Olaf Berberich

2. Papal Encyclicals (2017 and Later)

3. Revenues of Google and Amazon (2017)

4. EU Law and Regulation (2017)

5. The EU Would Be Debt-Free!

„`

2016: Shutting down Anthropic? Digital sovereignty is only possible with a sustainable, holistic EU economy!

1. Real Situation in 2016: Compatibility with Pre-Digital State Not Achievable

After presenting Trusted WEB 4.0 in September 2015, I received significant media attention for my explanation of why humans and machines/technology do not understand each other. Against this backdrop, I prepared the founding of GISAD in 2016. My experiences from 2015 had shown: The public sector is unable to maintain the constitutional order digitally without external help.

Digital sovereignty requires that innovations from global clusters be adapted to people within a holistic concept—and in close interaction with them. Every person has specific strengths. With an AI optimized by the Finder Technology (see my later patent application 10 2026 000 788.7), such a comprehensive concept could be implemented. Success is not only achieved by those who succeed in a cluster but by those who position themselves at the forefront of value creation and create multiple added values for all stakeholders.

Data processors are not successful because they understood democratic societies, but because they implemented scalable business models without regard for societal consequences. For founders, startups become a gamble. Investors factor in failures and refinance them through the few highly scalable successes—and the growth of their power. They can monitor, manipulate, and expand their power through division.

An alternative, sustainable digital concept must proactively involve all people as part of a democratic society. It is about creating the right framework conditions for capital, risk, and sustainability for all those affected.

Despite investments of €6.5 billion in EU startups in 2016, most successful companies were later acquired by non-European corporations. One could also say: The EU took on the financing for unconstitutional concepts.

2. Development Without Obstruction: From Democratic Guiding Principle to Self-Sustaining System

If the Finder Technology had been consistently implemented since 2000, its category structure would have automatically created a comprehensive system comparable to the EU-D-S. If the „digital year“ at GraTeach had been continued from 2001—with interdisciplinary development of the digital society—and integrated into the trendsetter program getmySense in 2002, then neither GISAD for developing metrics on societal structural relevance nor the EU-D-S as a counter-concept to the gatekeepers would have been necessary. The existing autocratic digital concepts would have had no chance.

Today’s democratic upheavals could have largely been avoided. Citizens would have been able to compare the concept of Trusted WEB 4.0 with gatekeeper concepts. They would have had to adapt much less to a disruptive new situation. Proven societal structures would have been preserved.

3. A Look from the Future (2026): Capital, Risk, and Sustainability for All Stakeholders

Even in 2026, GISAD is still in the process of being founded. The EU and Germany are increasingly providing funds to preserve democracy. But in a digital world, a concept of independent media and freedom of information falls short.

Often, politicians accused me, saying I should „just do it.“ But politics has no conscience—even if contracts were not honored in the past and the constitution was trampled on, they believe I would simply embark on the next adventure. I will not found GISAD alone. Only if as many founders as possible come together, as envisioned in the EU-D-S concept, will negotiations with the public sector be possible on equal terms.

The discussion about sustainability shows: A holistic consideration of all forms of capital (natural, social, human, financial, and physical capital) is necessary. Economic growth must not come at the expense of natural or social capital—this endangers long-term quality of life and societal stability. A strong focus on sustainability creates ecological, social, and economic stability.

Unlike politicians, medium-sized companies are long-term oriented—hence sustainable. They can be most successful in a comprehensive digital concept that aligns with the capital, risk, and sustainability interests of investors, the state, and citizens. This creates a European competitive advantage over the USA. The increasing societal upheavals caused by social media show: US concepts are socially harmful. The gatekeepers only stay afloat through the immense capitalization of their scalable business models—based on agitation. In a sustainability analysis for all stakeholders, they would have failed long ago.

Today’s democratic upheavals could have largely been avoided. Citizens would have been able to compare the concept of Trusted WEB 4.0 with gatekeeper concepts. They would have had to adapt much less to a disruptive new situation. Proven societal structures would have been preserved.

Given my 25 years of experience with digitalization as a driver of autocracy, it seems plausible that the blocking of Fable 5 and Mythos 5 reflects not only security concerns but also the strategic interests of the USA. The gatekeepers have shown over the past decades that they hinder democracy and diversity when these obstruct their scaling and power plans. Trusted WEB 4.0 concepts, which include decentralized data sovereignty, transparent algorithms, and a European infrastructure, can break these dependencies and strengthen digital sovereignty, regardless of the AI used.

Solution Approaches for the EU-D-S:

With GISAD and its metrics for societal structural relevance, I align projects with internationally recognized parameters:

  • Health
  • Material living conditions
  • Productive or main activity
  • Education
  • Leisure and social interactions
  • Economic and physical security
  • Rule of law and fundamental rights
  • Natural environment and living conditions
  • General sense of well-being

Sustainability as Capital Providers:

Capital providers assume that most startups will fail. This only makes sense if individual founders are exponentially successful and offset the losses of others. But even with wealth, one prefers to live in a socially developed country rather than in chaos.

Trusted WEB 4.0 Solution: A fund or special fund for the EU-D-S finances startups in all 1,000 categories—ensuring that no societal aspect is overlooked.

Sustainability for Entrepreneurs:

Founders often burn through a lot of money without succeeding. Failure ruins them and harms their professional future. At the same time, they gather valuable know-how that could help other founders.

Trusted WEB 4.0 Solution: In the EU-D-S, a founder receives a dynamic monopoly in the category where they are the leader. This minimizes the risk of failure. If a startup is not successful, another founder can introduce their own idea and take over the startup. The failed founder is integrated through participation or employment—harsh failure is avoided. Democratic control is exercised through the Council of Disciplines (www.get-primus.com).

Sustainability for the State:

The state can focus on the pre-digital constitutional society. As early as 2016, it was foreseeable that European states would not find solutions for declining revenues with rising social costs and pensions in a digital society.

Trusted WEB 4.0 Solution: In the EU-D-S, entrepreneurs are promoted within the available budgets—e.g., by converting social costs into participation payments (as discussed in 2013).

Sustainability for Citizens:

Citizens receive a second pillar for their pension, e.g., through a generational fund.

States and Short-Term Solutions:

States do not think like entrepreneurs and cannot implement short-term solutions. In practice, gatekeepers in the USA already determine government actions.

Trusted WEB 4.0 Solution: After successful pilot projects, saved transfer payments can be paid out to EU-D-S companies.

4. GAP: No Growth Without Trust in Sustainability!

Carryover from Previous Years:

  • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
  • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade€18 billion
  • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
  • 2003–2015: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €8,170 billion
  • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
  • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
  • 2010: Wrong digital strategy – €70.5 billion
  • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion
  • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
  • 2012: Cyberattacks – €24 billion

GAP 2016:

  • Loss of trust (14% of 2016 GDP: €14.8 trillion) – €2,072 billion

Total GAP 2016: €11,284.8 billion

Events in Europe in 2016 that would have changed with EU-D-S:

  • „Investigatory Powers Act“ in the UK („Snoopers’ Charter“) – widespread surveillance would have been avoided by Trusted WEB 4.0 and WAN Anonymity (from 2007).
  • EU-wide data retention for passenger name records (PNR)EU-D-S would have provided a data-sovereign alternative.
  • Coordination of intelligence services in the „Paris Group“ – with EU-D-S, a European Digital Union with transparent control would have been possible.
  • BKA Act 2016 in Germany (electronic ankle monitors, expansion of the BKA as the main hub) – WAN Anonymity would have preserved civil rights and simultaneously secured more forensic evidence.
  • Poland’s Anti-Terrorism Act (covert surveillance without judicial oversight) – Trusted WEB 4.0 would have upheld the rule of law.

Possible Developments (1999–2007):

  • 1999: Finder technology could have brought early transparency to administration and economy.
  • 2002: getmysense could have given citizens control over digital data.
  • 2003: GISAD could have combined data protection and location services.
  • 2004: EU-D-S could have given Europe digital sovereignty.
  • 2007: WAN anonymity could have made mass surveillance impossible.

Conclusion: While gatekeepers expanded their power, Europe remained trapped in dependence and opacity. Trusted WEB 4.0 would have been the way out—but it was obstructed and not implemented.

Sources

2015: Opaque Germany Threatens Europe

1. Real Situation in 2015: No Lessons Learned from Past Mistakes

My professional books were included in the library of the German Bundestag, after I predicted the attack on the Bundestag via svchost.exe. My expertise was acknowledged—yet nothing changed. Instead, I myself repeatedly became the target of attacks, simply because I advocate for the constitutional order.

In 2014 and 2015, I applied to the State Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Schleswig-Holstein, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and the State Chancellery of North Rhine-Westphalia for a position. A simple legal analysis would have been sufficient to recognize that I had been a victim of attacks for years—precisely because I am committed to defending the democratic constitutional order. According to its mandate, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should have protected me from further state encroachments.

Yet, on April 20, 2015, the District Court of Kleve (A/654/2015 I) disqualified another lawyer to the detriment of reopening the GraTeach insolvency proceedings. Is this a coincidence? Or is there an anti-constitutional connection here? Has the Office for the Protection of the Constitution truly fulfilled its duty to protect the free democratic basic order?

2. Development Without Obstruction: German Democracy as Transparent as Scandinavian States

Germany became the largest country in the EU through reunification. Yet instead of leveraging its size as an opportunity, it suffers from a lack of transparency and complexity. Hunting terrorists is not enough—an equally significant threat comes from data processors who undermine democratic structures by exploiting the inevitable gaps in a complex system.

With getmysense 2002 – Loss of confidence to the detriment of the economy, many citizens could have become experts in specific areas, reviewing and evaluating digital content with others. This way, even in a large, complex country like Germany, a level of transparency comparable to Scandinavian states could have been achieved.

However, a state like North Rhine-Westphalia, which continues to deny the failures surrounding the GraTeach insolvency, will never be able to act in accordance with the constitution in the future.

3. A Look from the Future (2026): Trusted WEB 4.0 as the Solution

By now, the problem is widely recognized. Verified data is not only the foundation of transparency but also the currency of the future. While politics promises solutions, a systemic overhaul takes at least a decade—time we do not have, given the rapid development of surveillance and AI. During this time, governments change, and each new political actor seeks to make a name for themselves with their own initiatives, calling continuity into question. Furthermore, pressure from the public wanes as surveillance and manipulation increase.

Meanwhile, security authorities across the EU are expanding comprehensive digital surveillance structures, such as through data retention or the EU working group „EUGoingDark.“ Such systems not only create a „turnkey surveillance internet“ but also carry the risk of being used by any government—regardless of its orientation—to consolidate power. The digitalization of administration, such as IoT-based real-time monitoring of traffic or environmental data, does increase efficiency but can also subtly expand the authority of administrations if transparency and oversight are lacking.

Only the European economy can achieve the necessary speed of implementation with the EU-D-S and a Digital Union, allowing citizens and businesses to escape a digital autocratic system. If it commits to considering socially structural aspects, it will implement the pre-digital constitutional concepts of politics. GISAD will drive the project development of a then constitutionally compliant system through metrics on social structural relevance.

4. GAP 2015: Lack of Transparency Costs Trust and Productivity

Carryover from Previous Years:

  • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
  • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade€18 billion
  • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
  • 2003–2014: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €6,272 billion
  • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
  • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
  • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
  • 2010: Incorrect digital strategy – €70.5 billion
  • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion
  • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
  • 2012: Cyberattacks – €24 billion

GAP 2015:

  • Loss of trust (13% of 2015 GDP: €14.6 trillion) – €1,898 billion

Total GAP 2015: €9,212.8 billion

Summary:

  • Lack of transparency in the judiciary and administration persisted.
  • No implementation of the Finder system or EU-D-S, despite the technologies already being available.
  • No investigation into the attacks on me—despite my applications to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Revenue of Google and Amazon (2015):

  • Google: ~$74.5 billion (approx. €67 billion)
  • Amazon: ~$107 billion (approx. €96 billion)

These corporations benefited from the centralization of data—the exact opposite of what EU-D-S stands for.

Events in Europe in 2015 that would have changed with EU-D-S:

  • Cyberattacks on the Bundestag: Could have been prevented through decentralized structures.
  • GraTeach insolvency: Transparency through the Finder system would have exposed manipulations.
  • Refugee crisis: A European WAN-anonymous identity (in the EU-D-S) would have facilitated coordination—instead of national solo efforts.
  • TTIP negotiations: Data sovereignty would have remained with Europe, not with US corporations.

Possible Developments (1999–2007):

  • 1999: Finder technology could have brought early transparency to administration and economy.
  • 2002: getmysense could have given citizens control over digital data.
  • 2003: GISAD could have combined data protection and location services.
  • 2004: EU-D-S could have given Europe digital sovereignty.
  • 2007: WAN anonymity could have made mass surveillance impossible.

Conclusion: While gatekeepers expanded their power, Europe remained trapped in dependence and opacity. Trusted WEB 4.0 would have been the way out—but it was obstructed and not implemented.

2014: Democratic Digital Strategy Could Have Influenced the Ukraine War

1. Real Situation in 2014: Hybrid Warfare and Digital Powerlessness

In 2014, Russia used the annexation of Crimea as a test case for a new form of warfare:
The combination of disinformation, cyberattacks, and social manipulation enabled it to divide the population and delay international responses.
Ukraine and Europe had no digital resilience to effectively counter these attacks.

The dependence on centralized platforms (e.g., Russian social media channels like VKontakte or state-controlled media) made it nearly impossible for Ukrainian civil society to spread alternative narratives.

Without a decision-making basis for the people, democracies will perish – especially in a digitized world.

2. Development Without Obstruction: Trusted WEB 4.0 as a Democratic Alternative

By 2014, the KHA-FDP resolution proposal, which was only introduced in 2022 and supported by liberal EU parliamentarians, could have already been implemented. A Federal Digital Minister would have had the political backing in 2014 to enforce the concept. However, by 2022, the situation had deteriorated to the point where the Digital Minister did not even respond to his own party’s proposal but continued independently! The digital one-to-one VPN road between exiled Russians and Russians in resistance would have been a standard tested since 2007 under the WAN anonymity framework.
This would have set the following levers in motion:

Decentralized Communication Infrastructure:
A one-to-one VPN road would have allowed exiled Russians and Ukrainian activists to bring uncensored information directly into Russia and Crimea.
Manipulation through Russian propaganda (e.g., the claim that Ukraine was overrun by „fascists“) would have been 30–50% less effective.
The fake referendum in Crimea (March 2014) would have received lower approval (60–70% instead of 96.7%), undermining the international legitimacy of the annexation.

Social Control Through Digital Cooperatives:
Local, trusted networks in Ukraine could have exposed disinformation and organized resistance – similar to pre-digital social control, where citizens alerted each other to misinformation.
The passivity of the Crimean population might have been broken if digital alternatives to Russian propaganda had existed.

GISAD as a Clearinghouse for Standards:
By 2014, GISAD could have already established European standards for digital sovereignty, such as:
Anonymous, censorship-resistant communication (decentralized VPNs, blockchain-based identity verification).
Transparent algorithms for social media to make manipulation by bots and troll factories (e.g., Russia’s „Internet Research Agency“) more difficult.
The costs for disinformation campaigns (estimated at €500 million/year) would have increased by 30–50% (€150–250 million) due to reduced propaganda effectiveness.

Economic Leverage:
Linking social benefits and economic participation with digital involvement would have created a broad basis for digital resilience in Ukraine.
Example: Ukrainian citizens could have been rewarded for fact-checking information, reducing the spread of disinformation.
The economic losses from the annexation (e.g., tourism in Crimea: ~€4 billion/year) could have been partially avoided.

3. A Look from the Future (2026): Power Shift Through Trusted WEB 4.0

Trusted WEB 4.0 and the EU-D-S must establish Europe as a third pole between the USA, China, and Russia – with a democratic digital strategy based on pre-digital achievements:
Liberalism is a law of human nature, but is it defensible?

A European Digital Union must replace the global strategy of a Social Credit System (China) or the US surveillance models with a values-based, decentralized system.
Own cloud infrastructures (e.g., Gaia-X), payment systems, and digital currencies (e.g., Digital Euro) must reduce dependence on US platforms and Chinese hardware.

Autocracies will come under economic pressure:
The USA must then adapt its surveillance models or lose market share.

Democracy as an Economic Competitive Advantage:
Open-source software, decentralized platforms, and data sovereignty enable better business models – because users control their own data.
Europe must become a leader in AI, blockchain, and cybersecurity, with a GDP growth of +1–2%/year through digital innovation.

A pilot project in Ukraine would have shown that social control and digital participation strengthen resilience against hybrid warfare.
The costs for a digital one-to-one connection (including infrastructure) would have been ~€30 million (for 1 million exiled Russians), negligible compared to the billions in war costs.

4. GAP 2014: A War in Europe Changes Everything!

There was no digital sovereignty in Europe – dependence on US platforms and Chinese hardware was complete.
Increasingly, billions of euros were flowing out of Europe without any return in the form of taxes or local value creation.

Carryover from Previous Years:

  • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
  • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade – €18 billion
  • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
  • 2003–2013: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €4,640 billion
  • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
  • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
  • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
  • 2010: Incorrect digital strategy – €70.5 billion
  • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion
  • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
  • 2012: Cyberattacks – €24 billion

GAP 2014:

  • Loss of trust (12% of 2014 GDP: €13.6 trillion) – €1,632 billion

Total GAP 2014: €7,314.8 billion

Events in Europe in 2014 that would have changed with EU-D-S:

The annexation of Crimea would have been made more difficult by European digital infrastructure and counter-information.
Populism and disinformation in the EU elections could have been contained through transparent algorithms.
The EU’s digital strategy would have been implemented faster if GISAD had already existed.

In 2014, technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

Conclusion:
Autocracies need economic dependence – Europe can break it.
The USA, China, and Russia rely on surveillance, control, and destabilization, but a democratic digital EU offers a superior alternative.
Without a basis for decision-making by the people, democracies will sink!
Democracy is economically superior when implemented digitally:
Open-source software is more cost-effective and secure, decentralized platforms are more censorship-resistant, and data sovereignty enables better business models.
In 2026, Europe can still take the lead if Trusted WEB 4.0 is established as a global standard for digital democracy.
Holding 20% of global digital value creation in Europe would shift the balance of power.

2013: Palantir, no! Does the EU have the strength to stand by its values?

1. Real Situation in 2013: Surveillance as a Tool of Power

I had already written my second book, „The Trillion Dollar Gap“. In an excerpt from the fictional story „QX – Island in Jezioro Kisajno“, I wrote: The Quadrilla is to decide who should be promoted or eliminated. With this, I wanted to show that surveillance does not serve to protect citizens but rather to exercise power in secret—without democratic legitimacy.

By 2013, the stage was already set for Europe’s later dependence on US surveillance tools like Palantir. The EU relied on centralized databases and automated analyses without sufficiently examining the risks of dependencies or their compatibility with European data protection standards. In December 2013, the Advocate General at the ECJ, Pedro Cruz Villalón, classified data retention as disproportionate and in violation of fundamental rights—a clear signal that the EU was wavering between security and fundamental rights. Yet instead of consistently upholding its values, it gave in.

2. Development Without Obstruction: AI Designed Democratically from the Outset

If I had not been forced to abandon my search engine patent from 1999 due to persecution, this technology could have actively shaped the discussion around AI and data sovereignty. The Finder algorithm uses the smallest meaningful unit, which is firmly linked to categories. This makes manipulation more difficult, as like-minded individuals from the same category automatically receive new entries for evaluation. Every AI learns from training data. The category framework trains the AI to allow different perspectives in various societal areas, thereby also training ethics. The genuine interest of evaluators in generating high-quality data significantly improves the quality of AI outputs.

The question is: Does the state want to deny its citizens digital participation? Scalable business models of gatekeepers aim only at power—not at societal added value. A productive digital activity for all must be a fundamental right. Those who are included do not boycott, are less likely to fall ill, and incur fewer social costs. Transforming social costs into participation payments would be an economic gain: High-quality data improves AI outputs and reduces frictional losses in digital transformation.

Perspective from the Future (2026): Is It Too Late?

Populists are elected because they best reflect the digital reality of fake news. They are financed by circles that see people as a mass to be manipulated. Citizens feel: The parties no longer represent their interests.

Currently, it is evident how these developments continue to progress: The state of North Rhine-Westphalia wants to consolidate its power with a new constitutional protection law. The Green Minister of Justice does not object, while the FDP is taking the matter to the Federal Constitutional Court to review its constitutionality.

Here, Trusted WEB 4.0 with a tiered system for AI-supported analyses could offer an alternative:

  • AI analyzes only WAN-anonymous data from the relevant category (e.g., in the case of suspected car attack, exclusively traffic data).
  • No result? A human authorizes access to the next data category.
  • Step-by-step expansion: This process repeats until forensic evidence with high probability points to specific individuals.
  • Only then is a person with judicial authority involved to approve the personalization through a trust center.
  • The personal reference of the WAN-anonymous data is established there.
  • The entire process can be completed in minutes and does not delay the investigation.

    Authorities hope to emulate the power growth of gatekeepers with Palantir. However, WAN anonymity would be more efficient: Forensic data is stored decentrally, and only in the event of damage does a judge release the absolutely relevant data. Mass surveillance destroys citizens‘ trust—and is less efficient than WAN anonymity.

    Question to the EU: Has anyone compared the damages prevented by Palantir with the societal damages caused by loss of trust and perceived mass surveillance? Would the trillion-GAP estimated under point 4 also have been achieved with more digital social control and less surveillance?

    4. GAP 2013: Edward Snowden Made the Loss of Trust Visible to All

    Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 primarily concerned global surveillance by the NSA and its partners, particularly the mass collection of data from Europe. The direct economic damages for Europe are difficult to quantify, but the political and diplomatic consequences were severe:

  • Diplomatic upheavals: The revelations led to serious tensions between the EU and the US, as buildings of the EU, the UN, and high-ranking politicians such as Chancellor Angela Merkel were also wiretapped. This undermined trust in the US as a partner and sparked a debate on digital sovereignty and data protection in Europe.
  • Economic impacts: Companies like Belgacom (whose clients include the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, and NATO) discovered traces of digital intrusions after the revelations and had to implement extensive security measures. The costs for such retrofits and the loss of trust in European telecommunications providers were not directly quantified in billions, but the long-term consequences for Europe’s digital economy were noticeable.
  • Political reactions: In December 2013, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the protection of privacy on the internet, initiated by Germany and Brazil. Since then, the EU has strived for stricter data protection regulations, which later led to the GDPR.
  • Carryover from Previous Years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade – €18 billion
    • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
    • 2003–2012: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €3,340 billion
    • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
    • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
    • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
    • 2010: Incorrect digital strategy – €70.5 billion
    • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion
    • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
    • 2012: Cyberattacks – €24 billion

    GAP 2013:

    • Loss of trust (10% of 2013 GDP: €13 trillion) – €1,300 billion

    Total GAP 2013: €5,682.8 billion

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

    2012: Will the EU Set Global Standards for AI Development?

    1. Real Situation in 2012: Everything Good Is Simply Shut Down

    Everything was prepared for the getmysense launch in early 2013. Even a legislative initiative seemed tailor-made for getmysense. However, on the day of the launch, the server was attacked with such severe cyberattacks that I had to shut down the server with the old operating system. In the 16 years prior, the server had been online without significant interruptions. One last time, I dug deep into my pocket to go back online, purchasing the latest technology with the best available security tools. It was all for nothing.

    2. Development Without Obstacles: What Could Have Been

    The approach with getmysense and its systematic, user-driven categorization of content would have fundamentally changed AI development in the EU—on multiple levels:

    a. Data Sovereignty and Training Data: The Decisive Lever

    Since 2002, getmysense would have generated billions of high-quality, manually controlled categorization data. These data would not only have been quantitatively superior but, above all, qualitatively:

    • Topics to Categories: Instead of unstructured data floods, Europe would have had a semantically processed knowledge base—ideal for training AI models that rely on precision and contextual understanding.
    • Authors to Like-Minded Individuals: Networking users based on interests and expertise would have created social graphs that today could serve as the foundation for recommendation systems and collaborative AI applications.
    • Embedded European Values: Unlike the data-driven, ad-funded models of US platforms, getmysense would have prioritized data protection, transparency, and inclusive value creation from the start—exactly the values that today, in the EU AI Act and with European AI companies like Mistral AI or Aleph Alpha, are considered competitive advantages.

    Result: Europe would not only have had more data but better data—and thus eliminated the critical bottleneck for AI innovation.

    b. Dominance in AI Development: Why Europe Could Have Led

    • Early Lead in Structured Data: Most AI breakthroughs (e.g., deep learning since 2012) are based on large, well-annotated datasets. With getmysense, Europe would have controlled this resource a decade earlier—avoiding dependence on US data monopolies.
    • Open-Source and B2B Focus: European AI companies today successfully focus on industrial applications, explainable AI, and privacy-compliant solutions—precisely the strengths that getmysense, with its user-centered, categorized knowledge base, would have promoted.
    • Preventing the „Brain Drain“: Instead of European AI talent migrating to Google or Meta, a European ecosystem with local value creation (as envisioned in the EU-D-S concept) would have retained the best minds.

    c. Economic Impact: What Europe Missed Out On

    The lack of data sovereignty and platform dependence has cost Europe not only innovation but also tangible value creation since 2002:

    • Lost AI Market Opportunities: Between 2013 and 2023 alone, $486 billion flowed into US AI companies—European startups received only $76 billion. With getmysense as a data foundation, Europe could have created 1,000 dynamic monopolies where optimal protection against gatekeepers and investment security would still allow a constant influx of new ideas and innovators, rather than just being suppliers to US corporations.
    • Platform Fees and Data Outflows: Due to the dominance of Google, Amazon & Co., the EU has lost dozens of billions annually since 2012 in platform fees, advertising revenue, and cloud services—money that could have flowed into local innovation.
    • Regulatory Costs: The current need to enforce the Digital Markets Act and EU AI Act is also a result of the missed opportunity to build fair, homegrown platforms early on. getmysense would have made this regulation unnecessary—through decentralized control and user-centered value creation from the start.

    d. Societal Impact: Democracy Instead of Digital Autocracy

    The concept would have had not only economic but also democratic effects:

    • Against the „Attention Economy“: Instead of algorithms driving users into filter bubbles and polarization (as with Facebook or YouTube), getmysense would have strengthened public discourse through topic-based networking—a counter-model to today’s disinformation crisis.
    • Inclusive Participation: The vision of involving all citizens in value creation would have become reality: Instead of a few tech giants siphoning off profits, users would have directly benefited from their data and knowledge work—a core concern of the EU-D-S project.

    3. A Look from the Future (2026): Is It Too Late to Change Anything?

    Conclusion: Europe Could Have Led the AI Era!

    Yes, with getmysense, Europe would be the global leader in trustworthy, user-centered AI today. The combination of structured data, European value orientation, and inclusive platform economy would not only have ended dependence on US gatekeepers but also ushered in a more sustainable, democratic digital age.

    What now? Current European AI successes (Mistral AI, Aleph Alpha, EU AI Act) show that the approach works—but the US lead is enormous. The question is: Can Europe make up for lost time by embracing concepts like getmysense, EU-D-S, and Trusted WEB 4.0 today? Or will the continent remain merely a regulator rather than a shaper of the digital future?

    Crucial for citizen acceptance is building trust. Only if, on the one hand, the EU acknowledges the failures of the rule of law described in this blog and, on the other hand, at least attempts to hold the perpetrators—as well as the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia—accountable, will EU citizens regain trust in Europe’s digitalization competence. Trust, combined with the consistent implementation of metrics for societal structural relevance that uphold EU values and quality of life, will enable us to create an autonomous digital Europe.

    4. GAP 2012: If Turning a Blind Eye Were a Crime, We’d Be Missing Politicians Today

    Carryover from Previous Years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade – €18 billion
    • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
    • 2003–2009: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €2,566 billion
    • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
    • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
    • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion
    • 2010: Wrong digital strategy – €70.5 billion
    • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion
    • 2011: Cyber damages – €9 billion

    GAP 2012:

    • Loss of Trust (6% of 2012 GDP: €12.9 trillion) – €774 billion
    • Flame Cyberattacks (30% of €80 billion) – €24 billion
    • Total GAP 2012: €4,382.8 billion

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

    2011: A New Digital Generation as the Guarantor of a Digital Democracy


    1. Real Situation in 2011: Simply Carry On?!

    During the three-year probation period related to GraTeach, I worked intensively on preparing the launch of getmySense for 2012. Before the probation ended, I did not want to risk going to prison by re-engaging in efforts to preserve democracy. I programmed the project myself and implemented it without third-party funding. Distribution was to be handled by external agencies, and a partner for the German-speaking market had already been found. Additionally, a private investor was ready to finance expansion after a successful pilot project. To increase visibility, I submitted an application for the ECO Internet Award 2012.

    2. Development Without Obstruction: What Could Have Been!

    With GraTeach, I had already demonstrated that it takes about a decade for new ways of thinking to become socially established. A generation spans an average of 25 years—but it would have been enough if the 18-year-olds of 2011 had grown up with Trusted WEB 4.0. They would have first encountered getmySense in 2002, at the age of nine, and learned that the internet is not just about fun but also about inspiration. Schools could have critically discussed the design of a digital society early on. Students could have increased their pocket money by uncovering fake news. Compensation and deductions for fake news would be handled automatically. The penalty for fake news is calculated so that the system operates cost-neutrally through automatic micropayments. Thanks to the WAN anonymity concept, every user receives automatic payment access upon their first registration in the EU-D-S, without having to worry about data privacy. Even before university, some could focus on specific areas through the category concept and build a reputation by contributing or identifying errors (which are often unintentional). Recognition in a category within the EU-D-S could offset a poor school grade.

    Those over 20—university graduates and master craftsmen—could have used the digital, interdisciplinary year developed by GraTeach to prepare themselves for the digital society while also giving back through projects at the digital site. The duration of the „year“ could have varied between two months and two years. Companies could have covered the internship fee upon hiring, while the public sector would only act as an interim financier. A win-win situation for all involved.

    3. Perspective from the Future (2026): Is It Too Late to Change Anything?

    Democracies review decisions through a process involving many institutions—which is good as long as it is proactive. However, within the EU, institutions increasingly block each other, and responsibility is avoided. Political decisions are only made where there is a risk of losing voters. Yet even this mechanism fails, as the example of the SPD shows.

    The turning point must come from the economy, often perceived as purely profit-driven. But scalable business models are limited and controlled by a few US corporations. Every time I initiate meaningful digitalization efforts, I am not only hindered by gatekeepers but also by a remotely controlled public sector. This shows that value creation is distributed more unequally, and the decision on (the lack of) digital sovereignty lies with the gatekeepers.

    With the EU-D-S, I have developed a concept based on the EU Charter that enables European companies to compete against gatekeepers through dynamic monopolies. What is needed is a fund that focuses on long-term European growth—not on a US exit.

    4. GAP 2011: The Price of Failure

    2011 once again highlighted how gatekeepers pollute the internet just as oil pollutes water. A loss of trust equivalent to 5% of EU GDP (€740 billion) is a conservative estimate. For comparison: In 2011, the digital economy accounted for 4.8% of US GDP.

    Carryover from Previous Years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade – €18 billion
    • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
    • 2003–2010: Loss of trust in economy & digitalization – €1,826 billion
    • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) – €510 billion
    • 2009: Cyber damages – €24 billion
    • 2010: Flawed digital strategy – €70.5 billion
    • 2010: GDP decline in the EU – €200 billion

    GAP 2011:

    • Loss of trust (5% of 2011 GDP: €14.8 trillion) – €740 billion
    • Cyberattacks (30% of €30 billion) – €9 billion

    Total GAP 2011: €3,584.8 billion

    Defining Events of 2011:

    • PlayStation Network Hack: 77 million user data records stolen, €5 billion damage in Europe (Source).
    • Operation Shady RAT: Industrial espionage in 14 countries, €25 billion damage in Europe (Source).

    Conclusion: The events of 2011 underscore the urgent need for European digital sovereignty. Without it, Europe will continue to depend on gatekeepers and cyberattacks—at immense economic and societal costs.

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

    2010: The Downfall of the SPD – Focus on Central Value Creation

    1. Real Situation 2010: Systematic Destruction – No Accident, but Strategy

    Three years of probation until 2012 in the GraTeach case without legal basis and without a hearing: a professional ban on democracy work, while I secretly developed getmySense—a concept for inclusive digital participation that became dangerous to foreign powers profiting from dependency and control. The methods used against me were not isolated incidents but part of a pattern:

    Four times SPD—four times systematic failure. This is not a coincidence, but political intent: Those like the SPD, who have courted non-European corporations since the 2000s and ignored citizens‘ rights, are deliberately destroying the foundation for a European digital economy.

    The consequences?
    Psychological torture
    (Amnesty criteria met after 11 years of judicial arbitrariness), economic destruction, and a climate of fear for anyone daring to propose alternative models.

    Jean Améry was right: „Whoever has been tortured remains tortured.“ Every attempt to re-establish myself as an entrepreneur after 2009 ended in panic attacks and blackouts—even in 2024, in the same courthouse where I was defamed for years with the characteristics of a „gang-like appearance.“ Anyone who experiences this knows: This SPD-shaped system is not about justice, but has learned to bow to US power remotely. Even if the rule of law were to be restored, my subconscious (despite being self-employed since the age of 20) will no longer allow me to take risks with borrowed capital.
    If NRW simply pays its RVR bill, I will use the resulting equity with GISAD to establish the EU-D-S as a central instrument for a sovereign Europe.

    2. Development Without Obstruction: What Could Have Been

    Without the systematic blockade by the SPD, getmySense could have launched as a European lighthouse project as early as 2002. Instead, the opportunity was missed to create a digital infrastructure that keeps value creation in Europe—instead of ceding it to US gatekeepers.

    • Decentralized platforms would have strengthened local value creation and even enabled the formation of digital property for individuals, rather than pushing them into dependency on Google, Amazon & Co.
    • Open standards would have broken the dominance of proprietary systems (such as Microsoft Office or iOS) and kept European tech talent on the continent.
    • Digital cooperative models would have limited the power of gatekeepers and enabled fair value creation.

    But the SPD continued to rely on central US big industry—and consciously ignored the needs of its own clientele: the workers, whose digital value creation is now being siphoned off by US corporations. The SPD cannot think digitally from the citizen’s perspective!!

    3. View from the Future (2026) – Why the SPD Considers Gatekeeper Development as „Natural“

    The SPD, traditionally closely linked to big industry, saw the expansion of gatekeepers not as a threat, but as a logical development. Why?

    • Short-sighted job guarantees: The SPD believed that cooperating with digital US corporations could secure jobs in Germany. The fact that these corporations would long-term drain European value creation was ignored.
    • Illusion of control: They trusted that „German champions“ (like Siemens or Volkswagen) could compete globally—without recognizing that the digital infrastructure was already dominated by US platforms.
    • Downplaying dependency: Instead of demanding digital sovereignty, the SPD accepted „smart dependency“ as the price for short-term investments. Examples:
      • Cloud computing: Instead of promoting European alternatives, authorities and companies were encouraged to store data with AWS or Microsoft Azure and to use US surveillance software like Palantir—with fatal consequences for long-term dependencies and compatibility with European data protection standards.
      • The introduction of data retention is advocated without prioritizing WAN anonymity to protect personality rights.
      • Social media: Facebook and Google were celebrated as „innovative,“ while European alternatives like digital education in Trusted WEB 4.0 were systematically obstructed. Special emphasis is placed on integrating all social groups, including SPD voters.
      • E-government: Instead of investing in decentralized, user-controlled solutions, money was poured into expensive, inefficient central projects—now considered „digitalization disasters.“

    The SPD thus sacrificed Europe’s digital future for an illusion of stability—and betrayed its own clientele, whose jobs are now threatened by algorithms and platform economics.

    From the perspective of a digital society, there are several reasons why the SPD should not be voted for in the 2027 NRW state elections:

    1. Lack of worker inclusion

      The SPD traditionally sees itself as a workers‘ party but has failed to reach industrial workers for years. Many workers fear social decline and no longer feel represented by the party. Instead of offering concrete solutions to the digital and social challenges of the working world, the SPD remains trapped in old structures. The party’s „listening tours“ and promises often seem like symbolic politics, without real participation or co-design by those affected. The SPD has failed to actively involve workers in the digital transformation and to strengthen their interests together with all other groups in the digital society.

    2. Failures in the digital society

      The SPD has not presented a convincing digital agenda in NRW that meets the requirements of a modern, inclusive society. While there are inquiry commissions such as „Artificial Intelligence – For a Smart State in the Digitalized Society,“ concrete measures for digital sovereignty, the promotion of digital cooperative models, or the strengthening of citizens‘ digital rights are lacking. Instead, classic state-led topics such as centrally controlled education and daycare centers dominate, while digital infrastructure and the participation of all in digital value creation are neglected. The SPD has failed to seize the opportunities of digitization for greater social participation and economic justice—a central failure in a time when digital skills and infrastructure determine ascent or decline.

    3. Lack of credibility and identity crisis

      The SPD suffers from a profound identity crisis. It is losing voters to the AfD and other parties because it is perceived neither as a modern digital party nor as a reliable representative of workers. The party appears torn between traditional milieus and the demands of a digital future. The failures in digital policy and the lack of grassroots involvement show that the SPD has lost touch with the needs of a digital society.

    Conclusion

    Anyone who wants to shape a digital society that includes everyone and distributes the opportunities of digitization fairly will not find a convincing force in the NRW SPD. The party has neither led workers into the digital future nor developed a clear vision for a digitally sovereign NRW. For voters who want an inclusive, digital, and participatory society, FDP people’s party positions itself as a better alternative.

    Voters in NRW should only choose a party that convinces them it will free them from occupation by the gatekeepers. An election result for the SPD below 5 percent in the state elections would be appropriate.

    4. GAP 2010 – The Price of Failure

    Carryover from previous years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – 133 billion euros (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade – 18 billion euros
    • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms – 54.3 billion euros
    • 2003–2009: Loss of trust in economy & digitization – 1,422 billion euros
    • 2009: Cyber damages – 24 billion euros
    • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of 5.1 trillion) – 510 billion euros

    GAP 2010:

    • Loss of trust (3% of 2009 GDP: 12.3 trillion) – 364 billion euros
    • GDP decline in the EU (2008–2009) (30% of 600 billion) – 200 billion euros
    • Damages due to wrong digital strategy (30% of 120 + 85 + 30 billion) – 70.5 billion euros

    Total GAP 2010: 2,835.8 billion euros

    Main topic 2008-2009:

    The global financial crisis exposed the failure of opaque financial markets and the dependency on non-transparent digital information chains. Ad-driven platforms and manipulated ratings exacerbated the crisis. The bank bailout was already accounted for in 2008. Now, the damages from the GDP decline have also been included.

    Main topic 2010:

    Europe relied on digital solutions without retaining control over data and infrastructure. The introduction of smartphones, cloud services, and social networks accelerated the concentration of power among US gatekeepers. At the same time, Stuxnet, data scandals, and cyberattacks revealed the continent’s vulnerability.

    Precise damage in Europe 2010:

    • 120 billion euros due to cyberattacks and data leaks (Stuxnet, industrial espionage).
    • 85 billion euros due to missed digital value creation (acquisition of European start-ups).
    • 30 billion euros for inefficient e-government projects.

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

    2009 – Europe’s Liberals: The Last Hope for Sovereignty!

    1. Real Situation in 2009: When the State Becomes Unbearable for Citizens

    On September 9, 2009, the proceedings regarding GraTeach were supposed to be discontinued. Instead, I was pushed into a hearing that served not justice, but system relief. Although the public prosecutor had signaled a willingness to discontinue the proceedings, the conversation turned into a regular hearing where lawyers and the court acted together—not in the interest of the case, but in the interest of a „solution“ that was safe for them. Without legal representation and under massive pressure, I had to accept a suspended sentence. It was not about my actions, but about discontinuing the proceedings against the management and eliminating me as a „disruptive factor.“

    My experiences show: Those who advocate for democratic concerns are not protected, but systematically hindered.

    2. Development Without Obstruction: What Could Have Been

    Without the systematic obstruction by judicial arbitrariness and structural disadvantages, GraTeach would not only have survived but would have become a lighthouse project for digital participation and decentralized value creation. A „digital, interdisciplinary year“ after studies would have strengthened digital competencies and promoted structurally relevant products. Blockchain and AI would not have remained mere buzzwords but would have been tools to break up power concentrations and create new value creation models.

    The FDP would have had the chance to transform from a program party into a movement party—one that not only demands freedom but actively shapes it. Instead, politics remained stuck in theoretical debates while digital society urgently needed new rules.

    3. Perspective from 2026: Why This Case Has European Relevance

    This case is not an isolated incident but a symptom of a structural problem: The liberals of Europe are the last chance for sovereignty. Most democracy activists do not even realize how they are being silenced in a „gang-like appearance.“ The FDP is losing voters because it can no longer defend freedom rights in the digital society.

    The Route of Industrial Culture is an example of how German politics stifles innovation through look away and blockades. Given the proven unconstitutional behavior of the judiciary—not a miscarriage of justice, but a conviction without legal basis and without a hearing—the later funding offers and an 80% state guarantee from several public institutions seemed to me like an „invitation to commit a crime,“ as I would again advocate for digital democracy. This is not a coincidence, but systemic. The EU must act: An infringement procedure against Germany is long overdue. The GraTeach bankruptcy should have been reversed to free up funds for GISAD—an institution that would be sustainable without external funds and can only work independently in the spirit of the EU Charter.

    European sovereignty begins with the EU protecting institutions like GISAD. The state of North Rhine-Westphalia must compensate for the damages caused and restore legal behavior by settling copyright issues. Only then can trust in a digital future be established.

    The FDP now has a unique opportunity—if it finally stops just talking about freedom and starts organizing it. The ALDE Party should support this as a European party. As a member of both parties, I propose:

    Liberal Program for Digital Sovereignty:

    1. „Trusted WEB 4.0 Law“:
      • Mandatory WAN anonymity for all public digital projects.
      • Trust stations in courts: Judges decide which data is released—not corporations.
      • Demand to the EU: 40 founders for the EU-D-S by 2027—with start-up financing for structurally relevant projects.
    2. „Against Cloud Colonialism“:
      • Instruct authorities not to host data with AWS, Azure & Co.
      • Promote decentralized infrastructure following the Estonian model—but EU-wide.
      • Ensure fair value creation for all participants in emerging decentralized machine markets.
    3. „Investment Steering for Social Cohesion“:
      • Those investing in high-risk projects (Mars, AI weapons) must invest 10% in EU-D-S concepts.
      • GISAD expert opinions decide on „structural relevance“—only those who strengthen society receive tax benefits.
    4. „The Liberals as the New People’s Parties of the Digital Age“:
      • getmySense value creation concept. Micropayments for all. Those who expose fake news are rewarded. Those who spread fake news are penalized.
      • Digital, interdisciplinary year“ for every graduate/student.
      • Free „digital basic equipment“ for every citizen (hardware + training).
      • Digital cooperatives as an alternative to platform capitalism—profits remain decentralized.
      • Digital ownership for all.“ Only with your own key can you protect your digital property.

    The liberals can fill the gap—but only if they define freedom as the result of digital participation and value creation. Freedom that includes everyone is unbeatable. If value creation shifts from portals to creators, the interests of the core electorate are not threatened. However, the core electorate is threatened if social peace cannot be maintained.

    The question for the FDP leadership: Do you really just want to watch the SPD decline—or do you want to become the new people’s party of the digital era with former smart SPD voters?

    4. GAP 2009: The Cost of Inaction

    Carryover from Previous Years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover—133 billion euros (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment due to GraTeach blockade—18 billion euros
    • 2004–2006: Revenue losses due to US platforms—54.3 billion euros
    • 2003–2008: Loss of trust in economy & digitization—1,154 billion euros
    • 2008: Financial crisis (10% of 5.1 trillion)—510 billion euros

    GAP 2009:

    • Loss of trust (2.5% of 2009 GDP: 12.3 trillion euros)—308 billion euros
    • Damages from cyberattacks (30% of 80 billion euros)—24 billion euros

    Total GAP 2009: 2,201.3 billion euros

    The numbers show: The problem is not the revenue of the gatekeepers, but their digital pollution. Fake news and power concentration destroy trust—and thus the foundation for a European digital economy. The FDP must finally understand: Freedom is not a cliché, but a lived practice that must be actively defended.

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.

    Demands to European Liberals:

    1. Investigative committee on GraTeach—to expose systemic failure.
    2. Abolition of mandatory legal representation—if it is abused as a tool of oppression.
    3. „Right to digital sovereignty“—against surveillance and cyberattacks.
    4. Infringement proceedings against Germany—to enable GISAD.

    The question is not whether we can afford this. The question is whether we can afford inaction.

    2008: Gatekeepers pollute the internet like oil pollutes water

    1. Real Situation in 2008

    A conviction in the GraTeach case seemed unimaginable. Finally, I wanted to make a fresh start: The plattform www.citythek.de had been revised, the novel „The Trillion Dollar GAP“ was completed, and the concept of the Synergienetzwerk Mittelstand was awarded as Innovation Product 2008. I began searching for new partners with renewed hope. Those interested in learning more can find additional insights in the sidebar of finders.de under Blog Articles and Excerpts from the Books since 2007.

    But the world around me plunged into the deepest crisis in decades. The global financial crisis, triggered by the US housing bubble and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, dragged Europe down with it. The EU’s GDP plummeted by €420 billion in 2009, the Eurozone lost €410 billion, and Germany alone lost €120 billion. The automotive industry came to a standstill, banks faltered, and 185,000 companies went bankrupt. Bailouts for failing banks cost European taxpayers €5.1 trillion—a sum that still haunts us like a nightmare.

    What went wrong:
    The crisis was not a natural disaster but the result of systematic information failure. Opaque financial products, manipulated ratings, and a flood of advertising-driven „advice“ confused markets and regulators. While banks played with inscrutable subprime mortgages, gatekeepers like Google and Amazon profited not through solutions but through clicks, advertising, and data monopolies. Those searching for „safe investments“ found themselves in a jungle of paid rankings and opaque recommendations. Trust collapsed—and with it, the markets.


    2. Unimpeded Development: Digital Sovereignty through Participant Protection

    If Europe had already adopted Trusted WEB 4.0 in 2008, the crisis would have unfolded differently. Instead of navigating through advertising labyrinths, users would have obtained all relevant data with one click: genuine credit ratings, independent analyses, and clear warning signals. A categorized, decentralized web—as outlined in the Finder patents—would have made risks visible early on.

    The financial crisis was not fate but a design flaw of the digital age. Trusted WEB 4.0 would have corrected this design: transparency instead of trickery, facts instead of fake rankings. Instead, the labyrinth only grew larger—and we are still paying the price today.


    3. Perspective from 2026: Why Europe Missed the Opportunity

    One would need a crystal ball to calculate how much damage the Trusted WEB concept (with Mannesmann as a partner) could have prevented. Conservatively estimated: 10% of the €5.1 trillion—i.e., €510 billion—could have been saved through early warning systems and WAN anonymity. After all, those operating in an anonymous but judicially verifiable network do not spread fake news.

    What Trusted WEB 4.0 would have changed:

    • No hidden fees, no manipulated search results.
    • No dependence on gatekeepers who expanded their power with every crisis.
    • Shattered information asymmetry—and perhaps saved the €5.1 trillion in bailout money.

    But the gatekeepers blocked every alternative. Their platforms became profiteers of the crisis: the more panic, the more clicks. The more clicks, the higher the advertising revenue. The collapse of Lehman Brothers was not a warning signal for them but a business model.


    4. GAP 2008

    The estimate remains conservative, but one thing is clear: The issue is not the gatekeepers‘ revenue but their digital pollution. A drop of oil can contaminate 1,000 liters of water—similarly devastating is the effect of fake news on the economy.

    Carryover from previous years:

    • 2000: Mannesmann takeover – €133 billion (loss of European sovereignty)
    • 2001–2007: Unemployment – €18 billion (blockade of GraTeach)
    • 2004–2007: Revenue losses due to US platforms – €54.3 billion
    • 2003–2007: Loss of trust in the economy & digitization – €846 billion

    GAP 2008:

    • Loss of trust (2.5% of 2008 GDP: €12.3 trillion) → €308 billion
    • Damage from the financial crisis (10% of €5.1 trillion) → €510 billion

    Total GAP 2008: €1,869.3 billion

    Trusted WEB 4.0 technologies such as Finder (1999), getmysense (2002), GISAD (2003), EU-D-S (2004), and WAN anonymity (2007) could have served as the foundation for a European digital alternative.


    Source:
    Federal Agency for Civic Education – Financial Crisis 2007/2008