1. The Real Situation in 2022: No Proactive Concept Against Hybrid Threats

In 2022, I experience a Europe stuck in a defensive posture. The digital dependence on gatekeepers—Google, Amazon, Meta—has long been a reality. At the same time, the Ukraine war escalates, fought not only militarily but, above all, digitally: disinformation, cyberattacks, and digital surveillance are the weapons of autocracies. The EU responds with regulatory attempts like the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA), set to take effect in 2023. However, these measures primarily aim for fair markets, not the digital sovereignty we urgently need to assert ourselves against the power of gatekeepers and autocratic states.

The costs of inaction are becoming increasingly clear:

• Cyberattacks and data breaches are on the rise, while Europe cannot present its own secure infrastructure.
• Ukraine is fighting for its existence, yet instead of creating a digital alternative that strengthens resistance in Russia, the West relies on military solutions.
• The gatekeepers dominate the market and, with it, political opinion-forming. Their platforms have become instruments of power that undermine democracies.

On June 13, 2022, I submitted the resolution proposal against the Ukraine war to the FDP. In it, I demand:

• Financial support for Ukraine to build a digital highway (1:1 VPN connections) between exile Russians and resistance forces in Russia.
• The establishment of GISAD as a central authority for developing standards that transfer pre-digital democratic achievements into the digital world.

The resolutions, supported by liberal EU delegates, were unanimous. But since Wissing was elected Digital Minister, seemingly important short-term challenges have shaped him. Since politics cannot prescribe proactive action to ministers, it is increasingly incapable of acting in an unshaped digital world.

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2. Development Without Obstruction: Digital Democracy Offers Resilience Against Power Concentration

As I keep repeating: As early as 1999, the Finder technology could have laid the foundation for a secure digital identity. In 2002, getmysense—a system enabling social control through digital participation without sliding into surveillance—could have followed. In 2003, GISAD would have created the infrastructure for decentralized, anonymous, and structurally relevant standards. In 2004, the EU-D-S (European Digital System) could have served as the backbone of a European Digital Union. And in 2007, WAN anonymity would have added another building block for secure, manipulation-resistant communication.

Had we consistently implemented these technologies, Europe would not be dependent on American platforms today. Instead, we would have:

• Built a digital highway between exile Russians and resistance forces in Russia. For just 30 million euros (30 € per connection), one million exile Russians could have established secure 1:1 VPN connections with Russians in resistance—and thus accelerated the internal disintegration of the Putin regime.
• Used Ukraine as a pilot project to test a digital democracy infrastructure. The cost? Laughably low compared to the billions spent on weapons and reconstruction.
• Established GISAD as a central clearinghouse coordinating cooperatives for digital participation in every linguistic region—though this would require the executive to be willing to confront its past mistakes. This could generate billions in savings through more efficient use of EU funds.

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